

Summit  
Press

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# U.S. EDITORIAL ROUNDUP ON POST-SUMMIT EDITORIAL COMMENTS

FOLLOWING IS A ROUNDUP OF JULY 5 AMERICAN EDITORIALS, COLUMNS, AND OP-ED COMMENTS ON THE NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT:

THE NEW YORK TIMES, IN AN EDITORIAL "FRAGILE DETENTE," COMMENTS:

"...THE FAILURE OF THE NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT TO MAKE A BREAKTHROUGH TOWARD A SECOND STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY (SALT II) COVERING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTIFIES TO THE CONTINUED FRAGILITY OF "DETENTE."

"THE FAILURE MEANS THAT THE NUCLEAR MISSILE RACE GOES ON, AT LEAST UNTIL NEXT YEAR AND PERHAPS UNTIL 1977. THAT DATE IS THE NEW DEADLINE FOR AN AGREEMENT THAT NOW HAS REPLACED THE 1974 TARGET SET ONLY A YEAR AGO AT THE SECOND NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON. IN FACT, THE RACE WILL PROBABLY BE SPEEDED UP AS THE MILITARY ON EACH SIDE PRESS ON TO GET AS MUCH DONE AS POSSIBLE BEFORE A CUT-OFF DATE IS NEGOTIATED."

"MR. BREZHNEV WANTS TO MAKE THE DETENTE "IRREVERSIBLE," HE SAYS, AND THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE COMMITS THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THIS LAUDABLE OBJECTIVE. BUT THE MOMENTUM OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY APPEARS TO BE IRRESISTIBLE. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN IRREVERSIBLE GOAL MEETS AN IRRESISTIBLE FORCE? SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER ANSWERED THAT QUESTION WITH THE WARNING THAT FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MIRV MULTIPLE WARHEADS MISSILES WELL BEFORE 1977 WILL MEAN "AN EXPLOSION OF NUMBERS AND OF TECHNOLOGY"--RAISING ANOTHER QUESTION "THAT WE WILL HAVE TO ASK OURSELVES...WHAT IN THE NAME OF GOD IS STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY?"

"THERE WILL BE A TENDENCY TO ATTRIBUTE THE SALT FAILURE TO WATERGATE AND TO THE U.S.S.R.'S RELUCTANCE TO MAKE FUNDAMENTAL CONCESSION TO A WOUNDED PRESIDENT WHO MAY BE OUT OF OFFICE BEFORE THE 1975 SUMMIT HE HAS PROMISED. BUT NOT ENOUGH IS YET KNOWN ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED IN MOSCOW TO BE SURE THAT IS SO.

"IT IS CLEAR THAT MR. NIXON DID NOT MAKE THE VAST CONCESSIONS TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT THAT HAD BEEN FEARED BY SOME OF HIS CONSERVATIVE CRITICS, SUCH AS SENATOR JACKSON. BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE OPPOSITE FEAR -- PRESIDENTIAL UNWILLINGNESS TO MAKE ESSENTIAL CONCESSIONS LEST HIS CONSERVATIVE SUPPORT IN THE SENATE BE ERODED--EXPLAINS THE SALT FAILURE. ALL THAT IS CERTAIN IS THAT THE GAP BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES WAS WIDE AT THE START AND IT COULD NOT BE CLOSED.

"NEW EFFORTS WILL BE MADE AT LEAST TO DRAFT PARALLEL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SALT II NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA. MEANWHILE, THE LESSER AGREEMENTS ON STRATEGIC ARMS THAT WERE REACHED IN MOSCOW ARE NOT TO BE SNEERED AT, PARTICULARLY THE DECISION TO LIMIT DEPLOYMENT OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES (ABMS) TO ONE SITE EACH. EVEN THE LIMITED UNDERGROUND BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTS, BARRING EXPLOSIONS ABOVE 150 KILOTONS, REPRESENTS A STEP FORWARD, MUCH AS THE FAILURE TO SET A TERMINAL DATE FOR EXPLOSIONS OF ALL TYPES MUST BE REGRETTED. THE REPORT OF A FIRST SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF A LIMITED KIND OF INFORMAL ON-SITE INSPECTION, IF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE, COULD REPRESENT A BREAKTHROUGH FOR FUTURE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES OF IMPORTANCE."

IN THE SAME PAPER, JAMES RESTON DISCUSSES SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE SUMMIT:

"...NOBODY SEEMS TO BE VERY HAPPY ABOUT THE NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT MEETING, BUT ACTUALLY IT WAS MORE HONEST THAN MOST. IT WAS A STAND-OFF--A HOLDING OPERATION IN A TIME OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY ALL OVER THE WORLD. IN THIS SENSE, IT WAS A REALISTIC CONFERENCE BECAUSE IT EXPRESSED THE POLITICAL REALITIES, WHICH ARE UNCERTAIN AT BEST.

"NATIONS DO NOT COMMIT THEMSELVES TO FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY CHANGES AFFECTING THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE WORLD WHEN BOTH POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY ARE IN THE PROCESS OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE, AND NOBODY KNOWS WHAT INVENTIONS AND POLITICANS WILL BE INFLUENCING THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

"HENRY KISSINGER IS UNDOUBTEDLY RIGHT IN THINKING THAT THE PACE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IS OUTRUNNING THE PACE OF POLITICAL STABILITY OR EVEN COMMON SENSE IN THE WORLD. "BOTH SIDES," HE OBSERVED, "HAVE TO CONVINCE THEIR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE BENEFIT OF RESTRAINT, AND THAT IS NOT A THOUGHT THAT COMES NATURALLY TO MILITARY PEOPLE ON EITHER SIDE."

"BUT NEITHER MR. NIXON NOR MR. BREZHNEV IS NOW STRONG ENOUGH POLITICALLY TO COMPEL THEIR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS TO CUT DEFENSE BUDGETS OR TAKE CHANCES FOR PEACE. IN A TIME OF POLITICAL WEAKNESS AND CONFUSION, THE MILITARY MEN AND THEIR POLITICAL ALLIES TEND TO PREVAIL, AND THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED IN MOSCOW.

"IN PRACTICAL TERMS, MR. BREZHNEV COULD NOT ENTER INTO LONG-RANGE MILITARY AGREEMENTS WITH AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT FACING IMPEACHMENT. SIMILARLY, PRESIDENT NIXON COULD NOT, WITH ALL HIS OTHER TROUBLES, AGREE TO CONCESSIONS ON WEAPONS THAT WOULD INFURIATE THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THEIR CONSERVATIVE ALLIES IN THE CONGRESS, WHOSE VOTES HE NEEDS TO AVOID IMPEACHMENT AND CONVICTION.

SO THE SUMMIT MEETING CAME OUT ABOUT AS EXPECTED. IF IT HAD BEEN ANY WORSE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A DISASTER; AND IF IT HAD BEEN PRESENTED AS A TRIUMPH, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A FRAUD. EVEN SO, THE PRETENSE OF SUCCESS ON BOTH SIDES BY MR. NIXON AND MR. BREZHNEV WAS A LITTLE THICK.

"BOTH MR. NIXON AND MR. BREZHNEV, HAVING DISAGREED ON THE PRIMARY QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, SOMEHOW FELT OBLIGED TO PRETEND THAT THEIR FAILURES HAD BEEN A GREAT SUCCESS. THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY LOST OUT TO THE HAWKS, BUT PRETENDED THE DOVES HAD WON. ACTUALLY, THEY CAME OUT OF AN OMINOUS MESS FAIRLY WELL, AND AGREED TO KEEP TALKING, BUT INSISTED ON OVERSTATING THEIR LIMITED AGREEMENTS.

"IN A WAY, THIS IS REASSURING. MR. NIXON AND MR. BREZHNEV DON'T AGREE, BUT INSIST ON TRYING TO AGREE. THEY DON'T BELIEVE IN THEIR DREAMS OF U.S.-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING, BUT BELIEVE IN BELIEVING, AND AGREE TO KEEP TALKING IN HOPE THAT SOMETHING WILL TURN UP. AND THIS IS SOME KIND OF PROGRESS.

"WHAT IS NOT CLEAR IS WHY THEY OVERSTATE THEIR LIMITED SUCCESS AND UNDERESTIMATE THEIR FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES, AND IN THE PROCESS CONFUSE THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET PEOPLES. ON HIS WAY TO KEY BISCAYNE AND ARGUED THAT HE WAS ON THE WAY TO "PERMANENT" PEACE, THAT HE AND MR. BREZHNEV WERE ENGAGED IN AN "IRREVERSIBLE" PROCESS TOWARD CONCORD IN THE WORLD, WHEN OBVIOUSLY EVERYTHING IS IMPERMANENT THESE DAYS AND REVERSIBLE.

"THE TRUTH IS THAT THE WORLD NEEDS FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE CONTROL OF MILITARY ARMS, INFLATION, PRICES, TRADE, POPULATION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, BUT DOES NOT HAVE THE POLITICAL UNITY TO DEAL WITH THESE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS.

"IT IS NOT ONLY THAT NIXON AND BREZHNEV CANNOT AGREE ABOUT THESE FUNDAMENTAL INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES ARE ALSO DIVIDED INTERNALLY. SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER DISAGREE ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ON THESE FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC QUESTIONS, BUT COVER UP THEIR DISAGREEMENTS.

"MR. BREZHNEV HAS THE SAME PROBLEM WITH HIS MILITARY LEADERS AND HIS POLITBURE. NO WONDER, THEN, THAT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT SATISFIED NOBODY. BUT AT LEAST IT KEPT THE NEGOTIATION GOING, AND RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENTS LATER ON IN THE SEVENTIES OR EIGHTIES.

"BUT THAT TIME, OF COURSE AS MR. KISSINGER IMPLIED, THE ARMS RACE MAY BE BEYOND CONTROL. ALSO, HE AND MR. BREZHNEV WILL UNDOUBTEDLY THEN BE OUT OF POWER, BUT FOR THE PRESENT, THE MAIN POINT IS CLEAR: WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW ARE STILL TO DIVIDED AT HOME AND STILL TOO SUSPICIOUS OF ONE ANOTHER TO REACH FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENTS ON A NEW ORDER IN THE WORLD.

"ALSO, THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY OF CHINA, EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND JAPAN IS SO OBVIOUS THAT NEITHER THE U.S. NOR THE U.S.S.R. IS PREPARED TO GAMBLE NOW ON LONG-RANGE MILITARY ACCOMMODATION.

"THIS IS WHY THE MOSCOW SUMMIT ENDED IN A SCORELESS TIE. NEITHER MR. NIXON NOR MR. BREZHNEV COULD HAVE COMPELLED THEIR MILITARY COLLEAGUES TO MAKE BASIC STRATEGIC CHANGES, EVEN IF THEY HAD WANTED TO. THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE IS TOO WEAK, THE TIME IS NOT RIPE, EVEN IF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES ARE OVERDUE. IT WAS A DISAPPOINTING SUMMIT, BUT AT LEAST IT REFLECTED THE POLITICAL REALITIES."

THE WASHINGTON POST, IN AN EDITORIAL "AN EPITAPH FOR DETENTE," NOTED:

"...THE PREMIER DIPLOMATIC PROJECT OF THE NIXON PRESIDENCY, TO NEGOTIATE MEANINGFUL CHECKS ON THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, IS STALEMATED. THE POINT OF ALL PREVIOUS ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WAS TO BUILD UP POLITICAL MOMENTUM TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS. AS RECENTLY AS THE LAST SUMMIT, THAT WAS THE GOAL FOR THIS ONE. IN MOSCOW, HOWEVER, MR. NIXON AND MR. BREZHNEV EVIDENTLY COULD NOT COME NEAR FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS TO PUT PERMANENT CONTROLS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS OR TEMPORARY STOPGAP CONTROLS ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE MULTIPLE WARHEAD MISSILES CALLED MIRVS, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND POLITICALLY THE HOTTEST BRAND OF STRATEGIC WEAPONRY. THEY COULD ONLY AGREE TO SEND THEIR NEGOTIATORS BACK TO GENEVA TO NEGOTIATE A "NEW AGREEMENT," TO FOLLOW THE INTERIM OFFENSIVE-ARMS LIMITATION EXPIRING IN 1977, TO COVER THE DECADE ENDING IN 1985.

"NOT EVERYONE, OF COURSE, AGREES THAT THE SUMMIT REFLECTS SUCH A GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT. MR. NIXON, AS HIS TV AUDIENCE WEDNESDAY NIGHT COULD PLAINLY SEE, HAS HIS OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS TO PORTRAY HIS DIPLOMACY AS FRUITFUL AND FORWARD-LOOKING ("THE PROCESS OF PEACE IS GOING STEADILY FORWARD"): THIS IS HIS PRINCIPAL BULWARK AGAINST IMPEACHMENT. MR. SCHLESINGER, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, HAVING LONG WORRIED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ILL-CONSIDERED ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, AT ONCE OFFERED THE STOCIAL VIEW THAT THE COUNTRY SHOULD BE RELIEVED JUST TO HAVE ITS DIALOGUE WITH MOSCOW SUSTAINED. CERTAINLY THOSE WHO PROFESSED TO FEAR THAT MR. NIXON WOULD GIVE AWAY THE NATION'S SECURITY TO COMPENSATE FOR HIS WATERGATE WEAKNESS HAVE BEEN PROVEN WRONG.

"BEFORE HE LEFT MOSCOW, HOWEVER, SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER UTTERED WHAT STRUCK US AS AN APT REMARK. "BOTH SIDES HAVE TO CONVINCE THEIR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE BENEFITS OF RESTRAINT," HE SAID, "AND THAT IS NOT A THOUGHT THAT COMES NATURALLY TO MILITARY PEOPLE ON EITHER SIDE." AS A STATEMENT OR ALLEGATION ABOUT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, THESE WORDS--SPOKEN IN MOSCOW NO LESS--ARE STARTLING ENOUGH. AS A STATEMENT OR REPORT ABOUT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, THEY ARE EVEN MORE STARTLING, SUGGESTING AS THEY DO THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAS NOT CONVINCED THE PENTAGON AND ITS POLITICAL ALLIES OF THOSE "BENEFITS OF RESTRAINT".

"RECALL THE UNCONTESTED FACT THAT MR. NIXON WENT TO MOSCOW WITHOUT HAVING RESOLVED STRONG DIFFERENCES AMONG HIS ADVISERS ON HOW TO PROCEED ON ARMS CONTROL. NO ONE CAN SAY FLATLY WHAT ALTERNATIONS IN ITS POSITION THE KREMLIN MIGHT HAVE MADE BUT IT IS EVIDENT THAT PRESIDENT NIXON DID NOT RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES HE BROUGHT TO MOSCOW IN A WAY MAKING SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS POSSIBLE. CERTAINLY THE AMERICAN "MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT" CANNOT BE FAULTED FOR OFFERING THE PRESIDENT ITS BEST JUDGMENT OF WHAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIRES. THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSIBILITY, HOWEVER, IS TO MAKE CHOICES AMONG HIS ADVISERS' COMPETING JUDGEMENTS. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IT IS HARD TO AVOID SUSPECTING THAT MR. NIXON NEGOTIATED AS HE DID NOT MERELY BECAUSE HE MAY HAVE BEEN SWAYED BY THE PENTAGON'S STRATEGIC ARGUMENTS BUT BECAUSE HE WISHED TO PROTECT HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL POSITION AGAINST ATTACK FROM THE RIGHT. IN OTHER WORDS, CONSIDERATIONS OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL INFLUENCED HIS DETERMINATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY. HERE IS WATERGATE AT WORK IN THE MOST DISPIRITING AND INSIDIOUS WAY.

"THIS IS NOT TO DISMISS THE PARTICULAR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THIS SUMMIT. THE AGREEMENT NOT TO BUILD A SECOND ABM SITE IS REASSURING, AND PERHAPS NOT ENTIRELY THE FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT MANY PEOPLE HAD THOUGHT IT TO BE. THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN, WHICH WILL LIMIT UNDERGROUND TESTS OF WARHEADS LARGER THAN 150 KILOTONS STARTING IN 1976, WILL STRIKE MANY OBSERVERS AS LATE, WEAK AND INCOMPLETE BUT IT WILL EVIDENTLY PUT A STOP, TWO YEARS FROM NOW, TO CERTAIN ARMS WORK THAT BOTH SIDES MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE CARRIED FORWARD, AND IT SETS SOME USEFUL TECHNICAL PRECEDENTS--EXCHANGING TEST-SIDE GEOLOGICAL DATA, FOR INSTANCE. THEN, IT IS GOOD NEWS, IF NOT EXACTLY WHITE HOUSE-TIP BROADCAST, THAT MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON WILL WORK ON AGREEMENTS TO PREVENT THE WAGING OF WAR BY MODIFYING THE WEATHER, AND TO TAKE A "FIRST STEP" TO CONTROL THE "MOST DANGEROUS, LETHAL" KINDS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE.

"THE POLITICAL RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT, FURTHERMORE, ARE NOT TO BE DISMISSED. "DETENTE," WE ARE ALL LEARNING, CAN PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR ORDERLY DISCUSSION OF DIFFICULT PROBLEMS LIKE THE MIDEAST AND EUROPE EVEN WHEN SOLUTIONS ARE REMOTE. THIS FACT IS REGISTERED IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE. ON TRADE, MR. NIXON--WISELY--SEEMS TO HAVE MADE NO PROMISES WHICH WILL PRECIPITATE A BATTLE WITH CONGRESS. THE VOLE HE BRINGS BACK ON SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICIES WILL BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD. THE APPARENTLY COMMON SOVIET-AMERICAN DESIRE TO MAKE NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS SYMBOLIZING PROGRESS IN DETENTE IS LEADING TO SOME PRETTY RARIFIED AREAS, SUCH AS--THIS TIME --"ARTIFICIAL HEART RESEARCH." MR. BREZHNEV IS TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES NEXT YEAR. THIS IS WELL AND GOOD. THE MORE THAT SUMMITS BECOME ROUTINE, THE MORE THEY CAN PERHAPS BE ISOLATED--THOUGH OF COURSE THERE IS A LIMIT--FROM POLITICAL TUGS AND PULLS IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

"FOR ALL OF THIS, THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE DANGEROUS ARMS BUILD-UP HAS NOT YET BEEN CHECKED. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE NOW MOVING AHEAD TO WHAT DR. KISSINGER CALLS "ASTRONOMICAL" NUMBERS OF WHARHEADS. "WHAT IN THE NAME OF GOD," HE DECLARED TO NEWSMEN IN MOSCOW, "IS STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY AT THESE LEVELS?" BARRING A MEASURE OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS IN THE ABSENCE OF A FORMAL AGREEMENT, THIS JUST MIGHT BE--AT LEAST IN RESPECT TO THE ARMS RACE--AN EPITAPH FOR DETENTE."

IN THE SAME PAPER, JOSEPH ALSOP EDITORIALIZES ABOUT "THE MESSAGE FROM THE SUMMIT":

"...DESPITE THE PRESIDENT'S TALK ABOUT PEACE, THE LOGIC OF WHAT HAS NOW HAPPENED IN THE SOVIET UNION IS BLEAKLY SIMPLE. PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER TRIED EVERYTHING BUT MOUTH-TO-MOUTH RESUSCITATION TO BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO THE TALKS ABOUT STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. THEY FAILED, AS ANYONE CAN SEE WHO READS THE BRIEFINGS AND COMMUNIQUE WITH AN INFORMED EYE.

"AS NOTED IN THE LAST REPORT IN THIS SPACE, THE FAILURE WAS PREDICTABLE. THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT CONCEDE TO THE SOVIETS ABSOLUTE SUPERIORITY IN STRATEGIC WEAPONRY.

"IN MOSCOW, MEANWHILE, THE SOVIET PROFESSIONAL MILITARY MEN HEADED BY THE POWERFUL MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MARSHAL ANDREI A. GRECHKO, HAVE THE WHIP HAND IN ALL DECISIONS OF THE KIND. THE MILITARY LEADERS WOULD HAVE HAD TO AGREE TO STOPPAGES, OR EVEN TO ROLLBACKS, IN EXISTING WEAPONS PROGRAMS IN ORDER TO PERMIT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

"ASKING MARSHAL GRECHKO TO ROLL BACK AN EXISTING PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS CAN PROBABLY BE BEST COMPARED TO ASKING GEN. CURTIS LEMAY TO SCRAP LARGE NUMBERS OF OUR AIR FORCE'S BIG BOMBERS IN THE OLD DAYS. AND MARSHAL GRECHKO, AS NOTED, HAD A VETO ON SUCH ROLLBACKS.

"THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE, AS ALSO NOTED, COULD NOT POSSIBLY GIVE MARSHAL GRECHKO WHAT HE WANTED -- WHICH WAS THE AGREED SOVIET STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY BUILT INTO ALL THE SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR ONGOING SALT TALKS IN THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF. THUS WHAT HAPPENED WAS FOREDOOMED.

"LOGICALLY, THEN, WHAT HAS RESULTED FROM THE RECENT MEETING IN THE SOVIET UNION MEANS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE GRIMLY DETERMINED TO GO ON BUILDING UP THEIR MILITARY POWER IN EVERY AREA OF ANY IMPORTANCE, REGARDLESS OF COST, AT THE UTMOST SPEED THAT THEY CAN ACHIEVE AND WITHOUT ANY KNOWN LIMITS. THIS POSES THE KIND OF QUESTION FOR THE UNITED STATES THAT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH TRAGICALLY REFUSED TO FACE IN THE EARLY 1930'S, WHEN ADOLF HITLER BEGAN THE GERMAN ARMS BUILDUP THAT PRODUCED WORLD WAR II.

"THE KIND OF FIDDLE-FADDLE, COMMUNIQUE-ORIENTED AGREEMENTS RACHED IN MOSCOW MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO CONCEAL THIS CENTRAL FACT. ADM. ELMO ZUMWALD DESPARINGLY CONFESSED THE OTHER DAY, THE UNITED STATES, BY RECKLESS SELF-INDULGENCE, HAS EVEN PERMITTED CONTROL OF THE SEAS TO PASS TO THE SOVIET NAVY.

"IN THE SPHERE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, IN OTHER WORDS, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOW HAVE TO WORK HARD AND INVEST HEAVILY MERELY TO RESTORE THE BALANCE IN KEY AREAS, LIKE CONTROL OF THE SEAS. IN SOME AREAS, WE CANNOT RESTORE THE BALANCE. HOW CAN WE DO SO, WITH OUR MISERABLE HANDFUL OF INFANTRY DIVISIONS AGAINST THE HUNDREDS OF SOVIET DIVISIONS?

"CONCERNING THESE MATTERS, ONE MAY BE SURE THAT THE PRESIDENT AND COMMUNIST PARTY SECRETARY LEONID BREZHNEV HAD NOTHING WHATEVER TO SAY. THEY EVEN SAID NOTHING, ONE MAY BE SURE, ABOUT THE ENORMOUS INCREASE IN SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BOTH ON THE NATO FRONT AND ALONG THE CHINESE BORDER. THE SOLE NIXON-BREZHNEV TOPIC WAS "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" (OR PARITY) IN STRATEGIC WEAPONRY.

"THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD ALSO ADOPTED A RATHER HUMBLE AIM BEFORE LEAVING FOR RUSSIA. BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE, THEY HAD AGREED THEY WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A "CONCEPTUAL BREAKTHROUGH." AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE OUTRAGEOUS PRIOR SOVIET PROPOSALS IN RECENT SALT TALKS, THIS PIECE OF GOBBLEDYGOOK MERELY MEANT THAT OUR SIDE WOULD BE DELIGHTED BY A SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT NEITHER SIDE HAD A RIGHT TO PURSUE OVERWHELMING STRATEGIC PREPONDERANCE.

"EVEN A "CONCEPTUAL BREAKTHROUGH," HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE CALLED INTO QUESTION THE NEW SOVIET PROGRAM FOR A WHOLE SERIES OF FAR MORE POWERFUL AND EFFICIENT ICBMS AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES OF GREAT RANGE. SO THERE WAS NOT EVEN A "CONCEPTUAL BREAKTHROUGH." THUS WE CANNOT ANY LONGER DODGE THE CENTRAL QUESTION, WHETHER TO "GO ON WITH THE ARMS RACE- -- AS THE MORE ASININE AMERICAN ACADEMICS NOW SAY.

"THE SAME PHRASE ABOUT THE "ARMS RACE" WAS USED BY THE BRITISH AND FRENCH INTELLECTUAL FOREFATHERS OF THESE AMERICAN ACADEMICS--THE PEOPLE WHO MAINLY PREVENTED A SENSIBLE RESPONSE TO ADOLF HITLER'S GERMAN REARMAMENT. AND IF WE FOLLOW THE ADVICE OF THIS SORT OF PEOPLE NOW, WE CAN TOO EASILY END IN ANOTHER CORNERED-RAT-LIKE SITUATION.

"THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ROBERT KEATLEY DISCUSSED THE "MOSCOW SUMMIT FAILURE TO GET ARMS PACT" AND A "NEW APPROACH FOR GENEVA TALKS":

"...PRESIDENT NIXON CLAIMS THE RECENT MOSCOW SUMMIT WAS A MAJOR STEP TOWARD BUILDING THE "STRUCTURE OF PEACE" THAT IS BOTH IS ADMINISTRATION'S MAIN POLICY AND ITS LEADING DEFENSE AGAINST IMPEACHMENT.

"BUT HE IS HAVING MUCH MORE TROUBLE THAN CONCEDED WITH A VITAL PART OF THAT STRUCTURE'S FOUNDATION: CONTROLS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT COULD SLOW THE ARMS RACE.

"ACCORDING TO MR. NIXON, HIS WEEK-LONG SOJOURN WITH LEONID BREZHNEV, SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY, BROUGHT A STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENT "SIGNIFICANTLY CLOSER." THAT'S BECAUSE THE TWO SIDES DECIDED UPON A NEW APPROACH TO WEAPONS CONTROLS, ONE THAT COULD PRODUCE COMPREHENSIVE LIMITS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS LASTING THROUGH 1985.

"HOWEVER, WHAT HE HASN'T EXPLAINED IS THAT THE NEW APPROACH IS REALLY A LAST MINUTE DECISION TAKEN BECAUSE THE OLD APPROACH HAD FAILED. THE RUSSIANS REFUSED TO OFFER ANY TERMS THAT THE PRESIDENT FELT HE COULD DEFEND AGAINST CRITICS IN EITHER CONGRESS OR THE PENTAGON. THESE CRITICS, NOTABLY SEN. HENRY JACKSON (D., WASH.), CONTEND THE PRESIDENT WAS READY TO MAKE UNSAFE COMPROMISES SO HE COULD CLAIM SUMMIT SUCCESS AND ENHANCE HIS IMAGE AS AN EFFECTIVE LEADER DESPITE WATERGATE TROUBLES.

"ACCORDING TO A SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL TRAVELING ABROAD SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER'S AIRCRAFT--BUT WHO ISN'T SUPPOSED TO BE OTHERWISE IDENTIFIED--THE SOVIETS HAVEN'T YET OFFERED ANY ARMS-CONTROL PROPOSALS THAT PROVE CLEARLY THEY'RE WILLING TO CURB THEIR OWN WEAPONS PROGRAMS, AND NOT JUST THOSE OF THE U.S.. THE ONLY SUMMIT OFFER THEY MADE, IN FACT, WOULD HAVE RESTRICTED SOME U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS BUT WOULD ALSO HAVE LET MOSCOW PROCEED UNIMPAIRED FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.



"THIS NATURALLY WAS REJECTED, CAUSING THE U.S. TO DRAFT WHAT MR. KISSINGER CALLS "A NEW FRAMEWORK" FOR FUTURE TALKS. THESE TALKS WILL BEGIN ABOUT AUG. 1 IN GENEVA.

THE SENIOR OFFICIAL SAID YESTERDAY THAT THESE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROVE WITHIN SIX MONTHS WHETHER MOSCOW INTENDS TO SIGN ANY EFFECTIVE CONTROLS ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY LONG-RANGE MISSILES WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS, CALLED MIRVS IF IT DOESN'T, THE SURE RESULT WILL BE A NEW SPURT IN THE ARMS RACE, RAISING BOTH MILITARY COSTS AND DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WAR.

"BUT UPON HIS ARRIVAL BACK IN THE U.S., MR. NIXON TOLD A NATIONWIDE TELEVISION AUDIENCE THAT AS A RESULT OF HIS VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND HIS TREK TWO WEEKS EARLIER TO THE MIDEAST, HE SEES "NEW PATTERNS... EMERGING, PATTERNS THAT HOLD OUT TO THE WORLD THE BRIGHTEST HOPE IN A GENERATION FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE."

"SPEAKING AT LORING AIR FORCE BASE IN LIMESTONE, MAINE, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE AND MR. BREZHNEV HAD AGREED THAT THE "EXTENSIVE WORK" ALREADY COMPLETED TOWARDS REACHING A LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC WEAPONS PACT "SHOULD GO FORWARD AT GENEVA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS GROWING OUT OF OUR TALKS." HE SAID THAT THE DISCUSSIONS HAD "COMMITTED BOTH SIDES FIRMLY TO THE RESOLUTION OF OUR REMAINING DIFFERENCES."

"ON THE RECORD, MR. KISSINGER REMAINS LESS OPTIMISTIC THAN THE PRESIDENT. SPEAKING YESTERDAY AT NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS, HE SAID, "WE BELIEVE THAT, IF THERE IS A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE A NEW LOOK AT THIS (PROBLEM) IN THE LIGHT OF DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN, THAT A NEW APPROACH CAN BE DEVELOPED THAT MIGHT...LEAD TO CONSTRUCTIVE RESULTS."

"THAT'S MUCH LESS EUPHORIC THAN THE WEDNESDAY NIGHT REMARKS OF A PRESIDENT STRUGGLING TO KEEP HIS JOB. AND THERE'S GOOD REASON FOR MR. KISSINGER'S CAUTION.

"GOING INTO THE SUMMIT, THE U.S. HAD ONLY A GENERAL APPROACH RATHER THAN PRECISE PROPOSALS TO OFFER THE SOVIETS. THIS CALLED FOR EXTENDING BY TWO OR THREE YEARS THE EXISTING LIMITS ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS THAT WERE SIGNED TWO YEARS AGO IN MOSCOW, PLUS ADDING CONTROLS ON MIRVS. THIS WAS TO BE FOLLOWED BY A COMPREHENSIVE AND PERMANENT TREATY THAT, BEGINNING IN 1979, WOULD RESTRICT ALL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

"BUT THE RUSSIANS DIDN'T BUY IT, AT LEAST ON TERMS THAT WERE SAFE POLITICALLY FOR THE PRESIDENT. THEY MERELY OFFERED TERMS THAT, IN THE U.S. VIEW, WOULD HAVE LET THEM BUILD EVERYTHING THEY PLAN ANYWAY THROUGH 1979, WHILE IMPOSING REAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE U.S. DESPITE INTENSIVE HIGH-LEVEL TALKS, THERE WASN'T PROOF THAT MOSCOW IS WILLING TO CURB ANY ARMS PROGRAMS FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS.

"IRONICALLY THIS BECAME CLEAR AT YALTA. THERE THE TWO LEADERS SPENT LAST SUNDAY DISCUSSING ARMS PROGRAMS NEAR THE SITE OF THE FAMOUS 1945 MEETING OF JOSEPH STALIN, WINSTON CHURCHILL AND FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT. THAT MEETING CARVED EUROPE INTO EASTERN AND WESTERN BLOCS AND HAS BEEN ASSAILED EVER SINCE BY REPUBLICAN POLITICIANS--INCLUDING RICHARD NIXON--AS A SELLOUT OF WESTERN INTERESTS.

"WHEN IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT MR. BREZHNEV WOULDN'T MEET CONDITIONS ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S., THE PRESIDENT AND MR. KISSINGER DECIDED TO TRY SOMETHING DIFFERENT. THEIR ALTERNATIVE WAS TO ADMIT DEFEAT, SOMETHING THAT MR. NIXON CAN'T AFFORD FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THUS MONDAY NIGHT, THEY DEVISED THE APPROACH THEY'RE CURRENTLY TRYING. IT CALLS FOR FRESH GENEVA TALKS SEEKING A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY RUNNING THROUGH 1985, AND WHICH WILL TAKE EFFECT WHEN THE PRESENT INTERIM AGREEMENT EXPIRES IN THREE YEARS.

"IF SUCCESSFUL, THIS WOULD ACCOMPLISH MUCH. IT WOULD COVER ALL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE FEARED MIRVS THAT THREATEN TO CREATE TENSIONS AND INSTABILITY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA. IT WOULD COVER SEVERAL YEARS, AND SHOULD LEAD TO NEWER AND MORE RESTRICTIVE CONTROLS LATER--PERHAPS EVEN REDUCTIONS IN ARMORIES. AND IT SHOULD CREATE NEW TRUST BETWEEN THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR GIANTS, ENABLING THEM TO PROCEED WITH MAJOR AGREEMENTS IN ECONOMIC AND OTHER FIELDS.

"MR. KISSINGER ARGUES THAT BY SWITCHING TO A LONGER-TERM AGREEMENT--RATHER THAN MERELY EXTENDING THE PRESENT ONE--BOTH SIDES CAN PLAN WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT MORE RATIONALLY. THAT'S BECAUSE THEY WON'T BE UNDER PRESSURE TO GEAR UP FACTORIES FOR ALL-OUT PRODUCTION IN CASE THERE'S NOTHING NEW TO REPLACE THE SHORT-TERM TREATY.

"THE TIME LIMITS WE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT UNTIL THIS VISIT," MR. KISSINGER EXPLAINS, "CREATED A SITUATION IN WHICH BOTH SIDES WOULD BE PRESSING AGAINST THE LIMITS OF THE AGREEMENT AT THE PRECISE MOMENT OF ITS EXPIRATION DATE."

"IT'S A SUBTLE ARGUMENT AND IT'S UNCERTAIN WHETHER CRITICS WILL FIND IT PERSUASIVE. IT'S ALSO UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SOVIETS AGREE OR ARE MERELY STALLING WHILE THEY PUSH AHEAD WITH NEW ROCKET PROGRAMS. DESPITE MUCH BOASTING ABOUT ITS MILITARY STRENGTH, MOSCOW REMAINS CONVINCED ITS NUCLEAR FORCES--HOWEVER LARGE--REMAIN INFERIOR TO THOSE OF THE U.S. THUS SOME ANALYSTS BELIEVE THEY DON'T REALLY WANT ANY ARMS LIMITS AT THIS TIME. THEY FIRST WANT TO MATCH THE U.S.' MIRVS AND ONLY THEN ENTER SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

"THE GENEVA TALKS BEGINNING NEXT MONTH WILL BE THE TEST. MR. KISSINGER BELIEVES WASHINGTON WILL KNOW WITHIN SIX MONTHS IF THIS NEW APPROACH WILL ENCOURAGE THE RUSSIANS TO SIGN EFFECTIVE CONTROLS.

"MR. KISSINGER CONTENDS CONTROLS ARE ESSENTIAL FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL. AS WEAPONS SUPPLIES GROW, HE BELIEVES THE WILLINGNESS TO USE THEM ALSO INCREASES. YET THERE'S LITTLE SIGN MOSCOW SHARES THAT PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERN, OR IS COMMITTED TO CONCLUDING SOME KIND OF ARMS DEAL. AMERICAN OFFICIALS BELIEVE SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING REMAINS BEHIND THAT OF THE U.S., PERHAPS TWO YEARS OUT OF DATE. THUS IT'S POSSIBLE MR. BREZHNEV HASN'T YET MADE THE BASIC DECISION THAT SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT IS VITAL, WHATEVER THE DETAILS MAY BE. IF HE DOESN'T DO SO SOON, THE PRESSURE FOR BIGGER AMERICAN ARMS BUDGETS WILL ESCALATE, U.S. OFFICIALS BELIEVE."

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